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Sensitivity to Operations I

Tracy Pyke • Nov 09, 2020

Minutes from a meeting to discuss Weick and Sutcliffe’s Five Principles of HRO

One physician advised a resident physician that, once she mastered a procedure she should teach it because in life she will be teaching her subordinates as she is performing the procedure. She came to him excited, she did not know all the things that went on while placing a tube into a patient's windpipe (endotracheal intubation). During the evolution of dynamic events we easily cone our attention to what we are doing, shutting out other activities as we concentrate. One of the first things we must teach a rookie is to be aware of all that is around him. 


 Sensitivity to operations is not customary for people, they have to learn how to do it, learn how to actively monitor. But we cannot do things on automatic.

 

In Naval operations the operator must manage the bubble in situational awareness, that is, what is happening all the time. As managers we may become automatic and loses awareness of what is happening. In Naval systems they use a system response, did the actions you take affect outcome?


Can we distinguish between situation awareness and sensitivity to operations on an organizational level? This is the key- Individual situation awareness in the larger organizational view. How do you reach that level? In part it is how you structure the organization but also security, lack of fear from speaking up, and appreciation of even negative information (what can hurt). It is a system, organizational, human dynamic that moves information up and down and laterally. This makes the organization acutely aware of where going, where came from, and where you are right now.


In a hospital, one physician will ask someone to contact an administrator-on-call or medical consultant. The person often responds with "what can they do?" His counter response is, "If I knew, I would do it myself." This is part of a complex system. It suppresses the drive to ask for assistance. Is this the antithesis of sensitivity to operations?


Query - what would you be asking administrator to do? A child critically ill, in deteriorating condition, needed transfer to the pediatric intensive care unit. The parents were Jehovah’s Witnesses and refused to grant permission to transfer unless he could guarantee no blood transfusion. By law the physician could have transfused if necessary a parent’s permission. Sometimes the wisest use of power is not to use it. The administrator calmed the family, explaining procedures. The parents then allowed transfer of the child. The physician had no idea how the administrator would fix the problem when he made the request. The administrator was very sensitive to the complexity of the situation.


 In fire fighting work things can inhibit information flow – procedures, task completion, personalities. One chief said to the captain on an incident, " The only thing I want to see in your hands is a radio mic." He found that if they help the firefighter then the information flow stops. You need to have pockets of information to communicate with each other. In time compression and short looped decision-making you need information flow to stay on top of the situation and the organization.


 For information flow, what kind of assistant do you have to escalate information flow? How do you create a system allows escalation information flow without overtaxing the system? Information cannot get to CEO for every issue. We cannot communicate linearly for everything. Sometimes you have to skip layers, but how do you manage this without breaking down the system? Need a workable system that works when you need it.


 If I have a question, I have to be sensitive that the resources I am drawing are not available to the rest of the organization. In human factors they use individual, team, in top leadership for organizational performance. Your organization structure is connected, when things go wrong there is a disconnection and they lose the shared perception of what is going on. STO to has to occur at each level.


 Social media can support the attitudes of high reliability. It is a tool that can give us authenticity and transparency. We value authenticity and transparency but we then shut them down. Charlene Li visited the USS Nimitz and ascribed a night landing. Landing at night is frightening. Every time you land you die a little death. This is transparency and authenticity. Think of information flows that go on simultaneously, a tool that gives us authenticity and transparency (even though many educators want to shut it down in their environments), strengthens the ideas of HR, mentioned Charlene Li and the experience she related as a blogger visiting Nimitz (wrote a book about it).


 Transparency can be confusing. Information is fine but you do not want everything to pass through-you need some prejudice. Internally, for operational effectiveness, they are constrained in using information that is applicable yet you also want external flow see how you work. Transparency is useful externally so people trust you. Internally you have to limit/constrain information to correct terminology, need internal information flow that is appropriate and correct, two different dynamics. 


Who knows to know what and when do they need to know it? We are poor at this in healthcare because they lack the culture of safety and tend not to share information when things are going wrong rapidly enough. It would help patients when we bring in additional assistance.


 In a United Kingdom chemical plant they had an alert system of "nonconformance." They would meet and talk about it the next day. They found a corroding tank and cleaned it the next day when they found it had nearly leaked. They were sensitive to the situation, investigated it in a controlled manner, and responded appropriately to fix it. How do you filter information so that too much does not go too high, bogging things down? If people saw something not right they would write a note about nonconformance. The tall caustic tank manhole looked extra corroded, took cover off to look into it, found corroded elbow at the bottom of the tank, found that it was about to fail, now escalated to urgent thing to replace elbow. Had it failed it would have drained tank. They investigated in control manner to prevent catastrophe, work later on why the piece failed, this group had a system of escalating concern and risk.


By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
This is a discussion with Thomas A. Mercer, RAdm, USN, (retired) RAdm Mercer, as Captain of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), requested an evaluation by academics from the University of California, Berkeley, to improve his crew's performance. He also desired to have an MBA program available for his crew. The academics did offer some suggestions but the end result was the codification of RAdm. Mercer’s command philosophy and modern leadership techniques as the High Reliability Organization. CVN 70 was the third of Nimitz class aircraft carrier, commissioned in March of 1982. The crew did an around the world cruise and reported to Alameda, California, a year later. This was unusual because they were not getting the normal support from their support command on the west coast before they departed. RAdm. Mercer reported one-third of the way into the cruise as the ship was transiting to the Indian Ocean (where the support from the west coast for spare parts and replacement aircraft engines dramatically improved). The accident rates as far back as the 1950s and 1960s were 17 accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Accidents, embarked and shore-based, are down now to less than 1 accident per 100,000 flight hours. The entire carrier force is now nuclear powered, which brings more capability and professionalism, appreciation for training and culture of doing things "right" that was not so before. The USS Nimitz was commissioned in 1975 while the fighting in Viet Nam was largely over in 1973. Throughout the Viet Nam war, most of the super carriers were conventionally powered starting with the USS Forrestal. The USS Enterprise was commissioned in 1961. All the carriers were "driven hard" because of the Viet Nam war. The USS Enterprise had a major fire off Hawaii, killed about 100 people, bombs cooked off (burned or exploded) after being hit by a rocket fired on the flight deck. The USS Enterprise had 8 reactors. All Nimitz class carriers have just two large reactors. Safety and readiness is a full system approach. The primary component of safety are the people, it is a people system with a very low authority gradient. Anyone can, and should, question what is being done. [Aside: VADM (ret) Gene Wilkinson, was the first CO of the USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear powered warship. He passed away this year (2013). He originated the famous phrase (at least in the Navy) "underway on nuclear power" in January 1959.] All nuclear trained officers, particularly the CO, are personally selected by the Director of Naval Nuclear Power. The first was ADM Rickover, the longest tenure of any four star flag officer in the US military. Nuclear operators are very technically competent. The CO sets the tone for the entire organization. Always on duty. Low authority gradient, anyone can stop an operation and question what is being done and is encouraged to do so. In the USS Enterprise grounding off of Bishop Rock, California, no one questioned the CO because he had trained each person on the bridge. A carrier’s Executive Officer is also nuclear trained and aviator. All COs of nuclear aircraft carriers must be aviators; they have not driven ships their entire career. The CO must rely on all his post-command department heads (Air Boss, Navigator, Operations Officer, Reactor Officer), senior Medical Officer and Supply Officer. The Navy's Chief Petty Officers (CPO), the senior enlisted officers, have become stronger and stronger during Tom's career. There is a lot of technical training and expertise, they make things happen on a daily basis with cross coordination with their counterparts throughout the ship. It has been said that the Navy is run by the CPOs. One of their most important roles is training the junior officers. In aviation squadrons, all the junior officers have many collateral duties in addition to flying so the officers depend on the Chiefs to get the work done. Some of the most junior people are the plane Captains, the enlisted person in charge of individual aircraft maintenance. There have been many improvements in the carrier (the ship), too. We have moved to angled flight decks to allow simultaneous launch and recovery. Planes touch down 92% on final and 100% on landing, four arresting wires and other barriers and pilots would sometime amiss and hit, have glide slope indicators and Landing Signals Officer to guide the pilots in, steam catapults instead of hydraulic catapults, just enough night lighting to keep you from having to sit in ready room in night goggles for 30 min to be night acclimated for night flying, still try to keep lights from casting to submarines and others, we have automated carrier landing systems so you can make hands off landing, he had in his career, but not perfected. Comment on responsibility toward the other person, to help and protect others on the ship. This is part of the sense of duty we discussed. Overall level of training and the culture are key components. People know they are top line people doing important work for the Navy. The formal training has become more and more detailed and viable. The Navy has an all volunteer force now as opposed to the draft during the Viet Nam War when we did not always have the highest caliber people. Many people want to enlist or reenlist and we don't allow it because they don't meet our standards. People feel like their trainee is their responsibility and would be very embarrassed if anything that happened to them. Always looking out for their buddy on the flight deck and throughout the rank structure people always have the philosophy and attitude that they are training their relief as they move up in responsibility. At an EMS conference 20 years ago, and EMS veteran with 40 years of experience remarked that he missed the camaraderie between EMS personnel and hospital staff. There was pride not only in the organization but also in the system. The other person's welfare is part of the training. In the Navy is this part of recruit training or is it emphasized later? Yes, it is part of recruit training but it is also part of unit policies and cultivated unit pride to build camaraderie and professionalism. You see a problem and you own it until someone gives you help. You teach people that everyone's job is valuable, trying to make sure that no one messes up another person's work, feeling that we are all in this together, there are few special privileges. Every person has worth no matter how menial his or her job. In healthcare people tend to look down on rookies and novices yet in the 1970s on the ambulance and in the fire department it was a source of pride by how much the rookie learned. How much the rookie learned reflected the quality and performance of the crew. In healthcare, the novice or rookie seems to be in the way. How do you encourage people to look after the new guys? Some personalities of course do not fit in, but there are ways to shuffle them off to the side or weed them out quickly. The demands for people and advancement make it necessary to ensure the new people learn as much as possible. People are always new in something. We know they will have to step in in an emergency and have a role to play in keeping the aircraft carrier or submarine running. The quicker you can get the person trained and reliable, trained like you are, the better it makes your quality of life. Every person can save the boat. Numerous groups want to bring High Reliability into their organization. It is easy to say but it is hard to do. You said that you always encounter opposition. You advised to move forward despite the opposition not in spite of the opposition. How do you work despite or with the opposition? You do get the feeling that it is you against the world. People try to take it as a matter of pride and good discipline. A book came out five to six years ago, It's Your Ship, by Michael Abrashoff. He happened to be the junior skipper in the destroyer group. He prided himself on not cooperating with other COs, to try to one up them. This banter must be friendly and not get out of hand. In some systems this type of friendly competition can further each other’s performance and make people better. You raise the bar for others. If you come in and change what they are doing there is resentment. Rather, tell them what is good, then, ask what else we can do? If it is not working, then in private discuss how we can do better. You are going to get resistance when you tell people they are not doing things the right way or need to improve so you have to be careful about appealing to their sense of pride and professionalism. We are designing out the hazards of a system, which may lead up as to designing out the capacities of the individual. For example, the use of auto landing systems in aircraft is such a system. Will this result in an effort to drive out risk and human reliability. As part of an High Reliability Organization, you have to have systems that are designed to allow humans to adapt to changing conditions that could be lost if we rely on more automation. A doctor he met at a conference at USC had the impression that the automated systems and air traffic controllers should be held accountable for accidents and that accountability had shifted away from pilots. While the academics from Berkeley focused on flight decks the piece de resistance of what you did involved kitchen duty. Some loved it, some hated it, and for some that was the best they were going to do yet you instilled in them pride in their job. As you said, “If you can take care of the ship below decks the flight deck takes care of itself.” In hospitals, no one pays attention to the lower ranks. How do you instill pride in in the lower ranks and acceptance by the higher ranks? Everyone does kitchen duty or compartment cleaning. When they report to the ship no matter what their technical training is (with only few exceptions), the first cruise in the summer at the naval academy is in the role of an enlisted man. Everyone in the organization has had to do their fair share of the "menial" work. Even the military academy must learn the job from the ground up. In medical school and residency this is called “scut work” and everyone is assigned these duties. However, it has the reputation of being meaningless, that it has no useful purpose. As a novice in many organizations you get free pass to ask any questions you wanted. This is a golden opportunity to learn. Health care does not seem to value this period. Is it to learn how the system works or because you are the lowest on the totem pole? You described a lot of technology that was implemented at the same time as you were involved with cultural dynamics and personal leadership. What kind of change accounted for what kind of improvements? Did things ever get less safe when you were introducing technology? Transition to some of the technologies was often not as smooth as you might think. His predecessor on CVN70 had a lot of time to work with marine architecture people at MIT and Carnegie Mellon in 1981 and 1982. They had a Wang beta email system throughout the ship. It had a very colorful and interesting map display system on the bridge and other areas of the ship well before GPS. It had a high-speed printer for generating all the paperwork the ship needed and some expert systems to improve air operations (fuel management, etc.). They had tried to automate many of the pre-underway checklists. All ship instructions automated and electronic. The problem was that no one was used to using them, computers were not strong enough to handle the load, checklists not easily updated when things needed to be changed. It did well in REFTRA, but it did not do well in the Operational Readiness Exam that followed. Many of these systems were detriments to the tried-and-true ways of doing things. Now the aircraft handler that manages plane status, arming, and fuel, and maintenance has automated systems to support him, but the automated systems cannot do all the thinking and coordination needed. Right now the LA water system is putting in system called Safe Start: mind on task, eyes on task, behavioral safety . The real problem is just keeping people motivated to do things they don't want to do. How do you motivate people to do those things they don't want to do? Make those basic unpleasant things universal so people know they cannot escape them. On the carrier, it is a test of how well you internally communicate, how much do you let people off at these training events know that they are still part of the team? Need them to know that someone is looking out for them and to return to their real job When people are sent off for training in tasks not relevant to their job, we must convey that they own the material. We must let them know they are not going off just to do something. People have to feel a sense of owning something or vision of how these things they don't want to do are important It seems like the sustainability of the motivation falls back to leadership to make it clear to front line staff that what they are doing is of value to leadership. They will see the value as well this way. What are we modeling when we say one thing and do another? The staff pays a lot of attention to the signals the leadership send.
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
Minutes from a meeting to discuss Weick and Sutcliffe’s Five Principles of HRO
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
Minutes from a meeting to discuss Weick and Sutcliffe’s Five Principles of HRO
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
Notes from a panel of people experienced in HRO
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
Minutes from a meeting to discuss Weick and Sutcliffe’s Five Principles of HRO
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
Minutes from a meeting to discuss Weick and Sutcliffe’s Five Principles of HRO
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
What is preoccupation with failure? For the Individual:
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
What is High Reliability?
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
Comments by Randy Cadieux, Major, USMC, MS
By Tracy Pyke 09 Nov, 2020
[Note, this is Duty and not referring to Duties.] Duty is the moral commitment that results in action. High Reliability is a choice. You choose to want to do well. Duty is willingly accepted, it is not an external motivation. Duty is intangible but it keeps drawing you back into your job. Dharma is duty or character, an essential truth in Hinduism. People may work at a job for money (utilitarian employee) but Dharma, duty or pathway, is why people perform well on the job. With duty you evolve personally while you are evolving the organization. Duty is the global overview of the mission; where the organization needs to go. The most direct quote regarding military duty is from Lord Nelson, “England expects that everyman will do his duty.” In an HRO they do their duty and then one step more. This brings relief to the team or organization when you do your duty. The Lord Nelson quote is also alignment – as with England. There is alignment between individual values and the country’s values. Duty is an ethical relationship to others; you are your brothers’/sisters’ keeper. Duty is responsibility for the welfare of others. In Crew Resource Management (CRM ) if you see something abnormal you must bring it to the attention of the crew. There is an individual sense of agency in the organization. This is part of who you are and you are a part of the organization. Duty is related to purpose – why you are doing it; not the what of your actions. Duty is why the organization exists; the values are real and they are used. Duty must be in relation to the mission and vision statements. “I am agreeing to do this as I like what the organization does. This is different from individual responsibilities; this is beyond the tasks of the organization. Duty has emphasis that certain things are required but HRO has a voluntary piece to it. You are required to do duty and this seems opposite of what HRO is. In reliability they range widely to see and do things you might not have thought of. [We are beginning to differentiate duty as task responsibility from duty as sense of duty or character trait aligned with mission of organization.] Duty is related to cause; what is the cause of an organization? You believe in the cause of the organization therefore you help it move forward. Alignment the culture of the organization between the person and the organization; then the sense of duty is profound. Alignment between organizational culture and the individual is through the belief/value system. Duty may not be appropriate for civilian organizations. Individual responsibility to the organization as a whole is seen in the uniformed services. They understand that their action and inaction can harm or help the organization. Duty comes from that. Duty of the individual – show up on the job; be responsible for yourself; you have responsibility for things in an HRO; all these are instilled and then branch out to make you prepared for the next big job when you can contribute (not getting by). Individual duties and higher level group duties exist. “In the presence of avoid, move forward,” Jim Denney. In High Reliability people move forward. Every individual believes it is their job even if others are also problem solving. Make duty infectious – don’t tell them to do it but they want to do it on their own, it is infectious to others who will then do it. An infectious attitude toward the cause and purpose, then each person will flourish and want to participate. They will self-sacrifice and go beyond their ego. Infectious or contagious – these are good in an HRO. You set the reputation of the ship when you go into a foreign port for five days after being as sea for 75-80 days. When a 6,000 member crew can leave without a significant liberty incident then you see the infectious nature of duty.
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